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This paper compares the financing of new ventures in start-ups (entrepreneurship) and in
established firms (intrapreneurship).  Intrapreneurship allows established firms to use information on
failed intrapreneurs to redeploy them into other jobs.  By contrast, failed entrepreneurs must seek other
jobs in an imperfectly informed external labor market.  While this external labor market leads to ex post
inefficient allocations, it provides entrepreneurs with high-powered incentives ex ante.  We show that two
types of equilibria can arise (and sometimes coexist).  In a low entrepreneurship equilibrium, the market
for failed entrepreneurs is thin, making internal labor markets and intrapreneurship particularly valuable.
In a high entrepreneurship equilibrium, the active labor market reduces the value of internal labor markets
and encourages entrepreneurship.  We also show that there can be too little or too much entrepreneurial
activity.  There can be too little because entrepreneurs do not take into account their positive effect on the
quality of the labor market.  There can be too much because a high quality labor market is bad for
entrepreneurial incentives.
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IBM spends billions of dollars every year on R&D, much of it aimed at creating new
products and businesses. At the same time, venture capital ﬁr m ss u c ha sG r e y l o c k
spend large sums funding R&D at start-up ventures, also with the goal of creating new
products and businesses. Scientists and executives routinely leave large companies
to start their own ﬁrms, and sometimes they go back to work for the very ﬁrms they
left. What determines whether new ventures are funded by established companies
such as IBM or by venture capitalists such as Greylock? Why do some people choose
to create new products for existing companies while others strike out on their own?
Why are so many new, technology-intensive business ventures undertaken by start-
ups in the U.S., while high-tech entrepreneurship of this sort is much less common in
Europe? Do the diﬀerent rates of entrepreneurship matter?
This paper seeks to address these questions by modeling the choice between entre-
preneurship and “intrapreneurship”, i.e., the choice between start-ups and business
venturing by established companies. The key distinction we draw between the two
types of business creation is that internal ventures are funded by ﬁrms with related
projects. Thus, failed intrapreneurs can be redeployed by their ﬁrms into other jobs.
By contrast, failed entrepreneurs must seek employment at other ﬁrms or start other
new ventures.
We argue that the intrapreneurial safety net has both beneﬁts and costs. The
beneﬁti st h a tﬁrms learn about the abilities of their managers, thereby enabling them
to keep the good ones for their other projects even if the new venture fails. Thus,
ﬁrms can avoid having to hire managers from the general labor market where they
are less well-informed about a job applicant’s abilities. The cost is that the safety net
is bad for incentives; knowing that failure is less costly in an internal venture than in
1an entrepreneurial venture, intrapreneurs will be less prone to take the necessary (but
personally costly) actions to make the business a success. In deciding whether the
best funding source for a new business is an intrapreneurial ﬁrm or an independent
venture capitalist, there is a trade-oﬀ between the informational beneﬁts of an internal
labor market and its adverse incentive eﬀects. The model implies that new ventures
in which incentives are important – those where the payoﬀs from the new business
are potentially quite large – will be undertaken by entrepreneurial ﬁrms. And, the
model implies that when the external labor market has many high quality managers
available to replace failed intrapreneurs, the value of the internal labor market is low
and more new ventures will be ﬁnanced in entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
This basic model of the choice of organizational form is combined with a model of
the labor market to generate an equilibrium model of entrepreneurial activity. One
of the key aspects of this labor market model is that no one wants to hire a failed
intrapreneur; the only ones that are on the job market are those that ﬁrms have
chosen not to retain, i.e., the ones they learn are bad.1 Failed entrepreneurs, by
contrast, are not stigmatized in this way because venture capitalists have no jobs
to which the entrepreneurs can be redeployed; being on the job market after failing
in a start-up is not as bad a signal as being ﬁred from an established ﬁrm. Thus,
if there is a lot of entrepreneurial activity, there will be a large supply of relatively
high quality failed entrepreneurs. This in turn, makes it relatively more attractive
to choose an entrepreneurial form of organization since the informational beneﬁts of
an internal labor market are reduced.
This sort of reasoning suggests that there can be multiple equilibria. At low
levels of entrepreneurial activity, it pays to set up an intrapreneurial ﬁrm – one
1Literally, we do not need that failed intrapreneurs remain unemployed. All that is needed is
that their prospects be worse than those of failed entrepreneurs.
2with multiple related projects to which managers can be redeployed if they fail –
because it is hard to ﬁnd qualiﬁed managers in the external labor market. At high
levels of entrepreneurial activity it pays to be entrepreneurial because it is easy to
ﬁnd skilled managers; the beneﬁt of internal labor markets is small relative to the
beneﬁt of providing high-powered incentives in entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
The model also identiﬁes an externality that may lead to too little entrepreneurial
activity. As described above, when there are more entrepreneurs, there will be a
greater supply of good managers in the labor market; this increases the payoﬀst o
ﬁrms that need new managers. In deciding on an organizational form, however,
everyone takes as given the choices that others make, and thus take as given the
quality of the labor market for managers. As a result, would-be entrepreneurs do
not internalize the positive eﬀect they have on the labor market and the payoﬀst o
ﬁrms that use it. In equilibrium, there can be too few entrepreneurs.
We also extend the model to show that there can be too much entrepreneurial
activity. If entrepreneurial activity is high, then it is relatively easy for failed en-
trepreneurs to ﬁnd jobs in other ﬁrms and the penalty for failure is not as high as
it would be were there little entrepreneurial activity. Thus, the decision to become
an entrepreneur reduces the eﬀort of other entrepreneurs, an eﬀe c tt h a tw o u l d - b e
entrepreneurs do not take into account when they make their decision of whether to
be entrepreneurial or intrapreneurial.
This paper is related to a number of diﬀerent lines of work. Perhaps the closest
links are to Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) and Landier (2001a,b). The for-
mer paper studies essentially the same question though its emphasis is on the costs
and beneﬁts of internal capital markets. In their model as well as in ours, internal
ﬁnancing comes with lower-powered incentives: because corporate headquarters con-
trols the ﬁrm’s projects, they can extract rents from the manager ex post, thereby
3reducing his ex ante eﬀort incentives.2 The beneﬁto fi n t e r n a lﬁnancing is that if a
project fails assets can be redeployed into other lines of business. Our paper diﬀers
in three ways. First, our model focuses on the redeployability of people, not assets.
Second, the lower incentives in ﬁrms stems from the redeployability of people to other
jobs in the ﬁrm, not the ability of corporate headquarters to extract rents. Third, in
our model, the choice of organizational form is embedded in a labor market model to
determine the equilibrium level of entrepreneurship.
Landier (2001a) also considers an equilibrium labor-market model of entrepre-
neurship. Like our model, the capital and labor markets cannot distinguish between
good and bad managers that leave other ﬁrms to become entrepreneurs. And, like our
model, there can be multiple equilibria. If the capital market thinks that managers
who leave established ﬁrms to start new entrepreneurial ventures do so only because
they have failed at their prior jobs, then no one will want to leave ﬁrms to become
entrepreneurs. As a result, there won’t be much entrepreneurial activity. If, instead,
the capital market interprets a departure from an established ﬁrm as a sign that the
manager has a great idea – that he would not want to leave a high-paying job to
start a risky, new venture otherwise – then entrepreneurs will get funded and man-
agers will want to start their own ﬁrms. In this equilibrium, entrepreneurial activity
will be high. While our model shares with Landier’s the feature that the market’s
perception of ﬁrm departures is important in understanding entrepreneurship, our
model diﬀers in our explicit consideration of the costs and beneﬁts of entrepreneurial
and intrapreneurial forms of organization.
Finally, we note that there is a large and growing literature on the ﬁnancing of
new ventures through venture capital (Berglof,1994, Gompers, 1995, and Hellman
2This part of the argument is also similar to Anton and Yao (1995) and Wiggins (1995) and is
similar in spirit to Grossman and Hart (1986).
41998). These papers, however, focus on understanding the details of these ﬁnancing
arrangements such as the use of convertible preferred stock, and the allocation of
control rights, and the staging of investments over time. Our model abstracts from
the details of venture capital ﬁnancing and instead uses a simple contracting model
to capture the incentive issues that arise in the two organizational forms we consider.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the basic model of the choice between entrepreneurial and intrapreneurial forms of
organization. Section 3 embeds this model in a labor market model and characterizes
the equilibria that can result. We also analyze the eﬃciency of the equilibria both
from the perspective of industry proﬁt maximization and social welfare maximization.
We conclude the paper in Section 4 with a discussion of the ways in which we plan
to extend the model.
2 The Model
There are three dates – 0, 1, and 2 – and two types of agents, investors and
managers. All are assumed to be risk neutral, and there is no discounting between
periods.
At date 0, investors have access to two projects X and Y .P r o j e c t X requires
the eﬀort and expertise of a manager at date 0. If the manager is good, then, with
probability θ, everyone learns at date 1 that the project is a success and that it will
pay oﬀ X at date 2 provided the manager stays with the project until then. With
probability 1 − θ it becomes known at date 1 that the project is a failure, the payoﬀ
is zero, and the project is shut down. If the manager is not good, eﬀort has no eﬀect
on the probability of success; the project always pays oﬀ 0.A t d a t e 0 , n o o n e k n o w s
whether the manager is good or bad, not even the manager himself. Hence, there
5is no problem of asymmetric information at that stage. However, at date 1, the
investor and the manager learn whether the latter is good or bad. This information
is not available to anyone outside the ﬁrm. 3 The probability that the manager is
good at date 0 is β, and the probability that he is bad is 1 − β.
The manager is able to choose the probability of success, θ, though he incurs a
personal, non-pecuniary cost of 1
2cθ
2 in doing so, where c>0. 4 This eﬀort choice
cannot be observed by anyone outside the ﬁrm and thus contracts cannot be made
contingent on it. The Y project cannot be undertaken until date 1, after the payoﬀs
from the X project are observed. For simplicity, we assume that it requires no eﬀort,
just the involvement of a good manager. If the manager is good, then the project
pays oﬀ Y at date 2; if he is bad it pays oﬀ nothing.
At date 0, investors choose the organizational form in which to take projects X
and Y . The investor can choose to keep both projects or to sell project Y to someone
who has no other projects. We think of the organization with just one project as an
entrepreneurial ﬁrm or start-up. We will call these E-ﬁr m sa n dt h em a n a g e r st h a t
run them entrepreneurs. New venture activity taken under the auspices of a ﬁrm
with other business ventures is often called intrapreneurship. Thus, we can think of
ﬁr m sw i t hb o t hp r o j e c t s ,X and Y , as established ﬁrms engaged in intrapreneurial
ventures. We will refer to them as I-ﬁrms. For simplicity, we assume throughout that
projects are allocated to investors once and for all at date 0.5 The main goals of our
3In essence, we assume that the investor learns more about the manager he employs than investors
outside the ﬁrm do. This type of assumption is relatively standard in the literature on labor markets.
4We will refer to this choice as eﬀort, though what we really have in mind is that there are
things that managers like to do (e.g., product development) and things he does not like to do (e.g.,
marketing). Choosing a high θ means choosing to do things such as marketing that the manager
does not like to do but that increases the probability of success.
5In particular, investors cannot trade projects at date 1, and contingent contracts involving
trading projects at date 1 are not possible. Otherwise, the initial ﬁnancier of a failed entrepreneur
6analysis are to understand (i) the factors that lead organizations to be entrepreneurial
or intrapreneurial; (ii) the diﬀerences between these organizational forms; (iii) the
equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activity; (iv) the eﬃciency of equilibrium. 6
2.1 Optimal Contracts in Entrepreneurial Firms
We ﬁrst consider the entrepreneurial ﬁrm. In order to motivate the entrepreneur to
undertake eﬀort, the investor must make pay contingent on performance. We assume
that the outcome of the X p r o j e c ti so b s e r v a b l ea n dv e r i ﬁable so that contracts can
be made contingent on the outcome. Thus, the contract speciﬁes a payment, wx,
if the outcome of the project is X and w0, if the outcome of the project is 0.I f
the project succeeds the manager stays on managing the project without exerting
any further eﬀort. However, if the project fails, the manager seeks a job elsewhere
for the second period. His only job alternative is to be hired by a ﬁrm with one of
the Y projects; these are the only new projects undertaken at date 1. In general,
the wage he receives from this second job will depend on his bargaining power and
his perceived ability (since the payoﬀ Y is realized only if the project is overseen
by a good manager). For the moment, we simplify matters by assuming that the
manager of a failed entrepreneurial ﬁrm has no bargaining power and that he is paid
his opportunity wage, zero, by a ﬁrm with a Y project. 7
The optimal contract is one that maximizes investor proﬁts subject to the con-
could acquire a project at date 1 let the failed entrepreneur run it. Therefore, our assumption ensures
that failed entrapreneurs have to return to the external labor market. This assumption could be
endogenized by assuming that there is much asymmetric information in the market for projects at
date 1.
6We assume throughout that parameters are such that optimization problems have interior solu-
tions.
7This assumption is made for simplicity. Relaxing it, which we intend to do in a future version
of the paper, introduces other interesting incentive eﬀects. See our concluding remarks.
7straint that the entrepreneur receives at least his outside option, zero, and that wages
are never negative given that the entrepreneur has no outside wealth. There is also
an incentive constraint that determines the level of eﬀort as a function of the incentive
contract. The entrepreneur’s expected utility is:





For a given contract, characterized by wx and w0,t h eo p t i m a le ﬀort level θ chosen
by the entrepreneur is given by:
β(wx − w0) − cθ =0 (2)
The investor’s expected proﬁts from this project are
βθ(X − wx)+β(1 − θ)(−w0)+( 1− β)(−w0). (3)
On the assumption that the individual rationality constraint is never binding –
we will check that this is the case later – the optimal contract maximizes expression
(3) subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (2). It is straightforward to show
that wx > 0 and that w0 =0 . Given the risk neutrality of the entrepreneur, there is
no reason to reward him for a bad outcome. To see this more formally, suppose that
the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint (2) is given by µ.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to wx and w0 of the associated Lagrangian is:
∂L
∂wx
= −βθ+ µβ ≤ 0, (4)
∂L
∂w0
= −(1 − βθ) − µβ ≤ 0. (5)
8Since wx >w 0 ≥ 0 to induce positive eﬀort it follows that condition (4) is met
with equality and that µ = θ. This, in turn, implies that condition (5) is satisﬁed




= β(X − wx) − µc =0 .( 6 )
Substituting wx = cθ
β from condition (2) and µ = θ from condition (4), condition
(6) implies that the level of eﬀort that is implemented in entrepreneurial ﬁrms, θE,





Not surprisingly eﬀort is increasing in X and β and declining in the cost of eﬀort,
c. Note that the optimal level of eﬀort is less than the ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e lo fe ﬀort which
is
βX
c . This is the case because the marginal beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n ge ﬀort is reduced
b yt h ew a g et h a tn e e d st ob ep a i di no r d e rt oi n d u c ee ﬀort. Given these values of










2 > 0. (8)
Therefore the entrepreneur’s individual rationality constraint is satisﬁed. The















The above discussion outlines the payoﬀsf r o mt h eX project. We also need to
take the value of the Y project into account. Investors in entrepreneurial ﬁrms sell
the Y project to other ﬁrms. The price they will be paid depends on the expected
9quality of the managers the acquiring ﬁrms can get to run the project. For now,
s u p p o s et h a tt h e yc a nﬁnd a manager with probability p, and that this manager has
a probability λ of being good, and that with probability 1−p they can ﬁnd no one to
run the project. Thus, the expected proﬁt from owning project Y is pλY .A s s u m e
that the entrepreneurial investor can sell this project for its full expected value. The
parameters, p and λ, for the moment exogenous, will later be endogenized. Overall,










E + pλY. (11)
2.2 Optimal Contracts in Intrapreneurial Firms
The key distinction between entrepreneurial (E) ﬁrms and intrapreneurial (I) ﬁrms is
that I-ﬁrms have two projects, X and Y .T h u s , i f t h e X project fails, the investor
has the option of redeploying the manager onto the Y project. If he observes that
the manager is good despite failing, he will redeploy the manager onto the Y project.
By doing so, he knows that he will get output of Y , though he may have to share
some of it with the manager. He could also try to hire a new manager from the
outside labor market just as E-ﬁrms do. However, the managers on the outside labor
market will be hired only with probability p and generate Y with probability λ.I t
is thus more eﬃcient to retain a manager identiﬁed as good rather than replace him
with a new one. In the event that the X project fails because the manager is bad,
the investor will choose to try and hire someone from the outside labor market, and
will get Y with probability pλ. The same will happen if the project succeeds and
10the good manager is needed to run the X project until date 2. Bargaining between
the investor and the manager retained or hired at date 1 will result in the eﬃcient
outcome. The investor looks for an outside manager only if the incumbent manager
is successful in the X project, or if he turns out to be of the bad type.
We also need to describe how surplus is shared between the investor and the
manager hired (or retained) at date 1. We assume that if a manager is hired from
the outside labor market, he is paid zero and the investor receives the entire expected
payoﬀ pλY . (We relax this assumption later in the paper.) If the good manager is
retained, he receives a share 1 − γ of the surplus he generates, Y − pλY .H i s p a y o ﬀ
is thus
(1 − γ)(1− pλ)Y, (12)
and the investor receives the rest of the payoﬀ from the Y project,
pλY + γ(Y − pλY ). (13)
The analysis of the optimal contract proceeds along familiar lines. The one
diﬀerence is that in the event the X project fails and the manager is good, he gets
ap a y o ﬀ in excess of zero because he is redeployed to another project on which he is
able to earn rents. Also, in this case, the investor is able to get more that pλY .T h e
optimal contract, therefore, maximizes:
βθ(X − wx)+β(1 − θ)[γ (1 − pλ)Y − w0]+( 1− β)(−w0)+pλY. (14)
The manager’s expected utility is





11As before, it is straightforward to show that w0 =0 ;w ed on o tr e p e a tt h ea r g u -
ments here. The manager’s ﬁrst order condition for the selection of θ is as follows:
β[wx − (1 − γ)(1 − pλ)Y ] − cθ =0 . (16)
By comparing conditions (2) and (16) it is clear that in order to motivate the
same level of eﬀort in E and I-ﬁrms, one has to pay a higher wage, wx in I-ﬁrms;
given that good managers get a higher payoﬀ when they fail in I-ﬁrms they have to
be paid more for success. As before, if µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive
constraint (16), the ﬁrst order condition for wx,i m p l i e st h a tµ = θ.T h e ﬁrst order
condition with respect to θ is:
β[X − wx − γ(1 − pλ)Y ] − cθ =0 . (17)




+( 1− γ)(1 − pλ)Y. (18)
Substituting this expression for wx into (17) generates the following expression for




[X − (1 − pλ)Y ]. (19)
Notice that eﬀort in I-ﬁr m si sa l w a y sl o w e rt h a nt h a ti nE - ﬁrms; θI <θ E.N o t i c e
also that θI does not depend on the bargaining power of investors in intrapreneurial
ﬁrm. This is because an increase in γ has two eﬀects. On the one hand, inducing a
higher level of eﬀort by the manager is less costly for the investor because the manager
receives less rent when he is reallocated to the Y project following failure of the X
project. On the other hand, the investor is less keen to induce high eﬀort because
12he receives a higher expected payoﬀ following failure of the X project. In our set-up
both eﬀects cancel out and the optimal eﬀort level implemented is independent of γ.
Substituting wx into the expression for the investor’s proﬁts reveals the trade-oﬀs
that he faces. Expected proﬁts can be written as:
ΠI = βθI[X −
cθI
β
− (1 − γ)(1 − pλ)Y ]+β(1 − θI)γ(1 − pλ)Y + pλY. (20)
On the one hand, having the Y project increases expected proﬁts relative to an
entrepreneurial ﬁrm because it enables the investor to redeploy a good manager onto
the Y project with probability β(1−θ) a n dt oe a r nr e n t so fγ(1−pλ)Y .O n t h e o t h e r
hand, being able to redeploy the manager in this way creates incentive problems in
the X project. The intrapreneurial manager knows that with probability β (1 − θ)
he will be redeployed and earn rents of (1−γ)(1−pλ)Y . Thus, to motivate his eﬀort
he will have to be paid more for a successful outcome of the X project.
Finally, we note that ΠI can be written as:
ΠI = cθ
2
I + βγ(1 − pλ)Y + pλY. (21)
2.3 Entrepreneurship vs. Intrapreneurship
We now examine the factors that lead the investor to choose an entrepreneurial or
intrapreneurial form of organization. Analytically, this just amounts to comparing
ΠE and ΠI. Using the expressions (11) and (21) for ΠE and ΠI, we see that




I] − βγ(1 − pλ)Y (22)
This expression is the diﬀerence between two positive terms. The ﬁrst term
reﬂects the advantage of E-ﬁrms over I-ﬁrms in terms of incentives (recall that θE >
13θI). The second term captures the advantage of I-ﬁrms over E-ﬁrms in terms of
identifying and allocating good managers to projects.
At this point it worth emphasizing why I-ﬁr m sc a n n o ta l w a y sd oa sl e a s ta sw e l la s
E-ﬁrms. The problem of I-ﬁrms is one of time inconsistency. Ex-ante, I-ﬁrms might
ﬁnd it optimal to threaten their manager to ﬁre them in case of failure. However,
ex-post, if the failed intrapreneur has been identiﬁed as a high ability manager, the
investor will ﬁnd it optimal to retain him nevertheless. This commitment problem
is absent for E-ﬁrms because they have no project to which the failed entrepreneurs
can be reallocated. 8
Substituting θE and θI in the above expression and rearranging terms we see that
ΠE > ΠI provided that the following condition holds
β
2c
[X − (1 − pλ)
Y
2
] >γ . (23)
This inequality generates predictions about the factors that will lead some projects
to be undertaken in entrepreneurial and others in intrapreneurial settings. They are
summarized in our ﬁrst proposition below.
Proposition 1 Given p and λ,
(i) Projects with high payoﬀs, X,will be ﬁnanced in entrepreneurial ﬁrms;
(ii) Higher ability managers (i.e., with high β) will become entrepreneurs;
8A related argument is developed in Crémer (1995). In his model of arm’s length relationships,
a principal can optimally choose to remain uninformed about a agent so as not to have incentive
to renegotiate his incentive contract ex-post. In our model, investors in E-ﬁrms are informed but
cannot use this information. Our point is also related to the literature on the soft budget constraint
and information. See Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1995).
14(iii) Projects with low associated eﬀort costs, c,w i l lb eﬁnanced in entrepreneurial
ﬁrms and managers with low eﬀort costs will become entrepreneurs;
(iv) When the alternative project, Y , has low value the project X will be ﬁnanced in
entrepreneurial ﬁrms;
(v) When there is an active market for high quality managers to run project Y (i.e.,
pλ is high), project X will be ﬁnanced by entrepreneurial ﬁrms;
(vi) When intrapreneurial ﬁrms have little bargaining power with respect to their
managers (i.e., γ is small), projects will be ﬁnanced in entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 summarizes some of the main ﬁndings of the paper and is a key
building block for our analysis of the equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activity
developed in the next sections. When there are large diﬀerences in the eﬀort levels
between E-ﬁrms and I-ﬁrms, it is better to ﬁnance the project in entrepreneurial
settings. This occurs when the payoﬀs from inducing the manager to take high eﬀort
are large – i.e.,when project payoﬀs, X,a r eh i g h ,w h e nm a n a g e r sa r el i k e l yt ob e
good (high β), and when eﬀort costs are small (c low). This explains parts (i)-(iii)
of the proposition.
The reason to ﬁnance the X project within I-ﬁrms is to take advantage of the
information that is learned about the ability of the manager. If he turns out to be
a good manager even though the project fails, he can be redeployed to the Y project
and the ﬁrm will earn some portion γ of the surplus generated by being able to put
someone of known high ability in the Y project instead of someone of uncertain ability
(1−pλ)Y .T h u s , w h e n Y is small the value of redeployability is low and E-ﬁrms are
a more attractive organizational form.
Of particular interest is the inﬂuence of characteristics of the outside labor market
on the optimal choice of organizational structure. Recall that the value of both E-
15ﬁrms and I-ﬁrms increases with the depth of the outside labor market for high ability
managers, i.e., with p and λ. Proposition 1(v) states that the diﬀerence in values,
ΠE (α) − ΠI (α), is also increasing in pand λ.W h e n p and λ are high, high ability
managers can be easily found in the labor market and so there is less value to knowing
that the intrapreneurial manager is good.
When the intrapreneurial ﬁrm has limited bargaining power, the rents that the
ﬁrm receives from redeployability are low (even though (1 − pλ)Y may be relatively
high), so that an entrepreneurial organizational structure is more appealing.
The model also allows us to compare incentives and compensation in E-ﬁrms and
I-ﬁrms. E-ﬁr m sh a v em o r eh i g h - p o w e r e di n c e n t i v e sa sm e a s u r e db yt h ed i ﬀerence
in the compensation between good and bad outcomes. For E-ﬁr m st h i sd i ﬀerence
is X/2,w h e r e a sf o rY ﬁrms the diﬀerence is only [X − (1 − pλ)Y ]/2. However, it
is not necessarily the case that compensation for success, wx,i sh i g h e ri nE - ﬁrms.
Indeed, because the payoﬀ w h e np e r f o r m a n c ei sp o o ri sh i g h e ri nI - ﬁrms – it’s
(1 − γ)(1 − pλ)Y compared to zero in E-ﬁrms – wx has to be higher to induce
the same eﬀo r ti na nI -ﬁrm as in an E-ﬁrm. Comparing conditions (2) and (18),
the expressions for wx in E-ﬁrms and I-ﬁrms, and substituting the optimal levels of
eﬀort, we see that wx in I-ﬁrms will exceed that in E-ﬁrms provided that γ<1/2.
By contrast, casual empiricism suggests that the upside compensation is much higher
for entrepreneurs than it is for managers of established ﬁrms. Indeed, this is one of
the reasons often oﬀered for why managers leave established ﬁrms to start their own
companies. How can we square this result with the contradictory casual empiricism?
The answer lies in recognizing that the characteristics of E and I-ﬁrms diﬀer along
other dimensions that aﬀect wx. In particular, from equation (23) and Proposition








the ﬁrm will be entrepreneurial. Denote the right-hand-side of the inequality ˆ X and
suppose that X is distributed uniformly on [Xl,X h]. Then, the average compensation
for successful entrepreneurs is (Xh + ˆ X)/4, whereas the average compensation of
intrapreneurs is ( ˆ X +Xl)/4+(1−γ− 1
2)(1−pλ)Y . Thus, the average compensation
of successful entrepreneurs will exceed that of successful intrapreneurs, provided:
Xh − Xl
4
− (1 − γ −
1
2
)(1 − pλ)Y> 0. (25)
If X is widely distributed, i.e., Xh − Xl is large, as is typically the case in new
ventures, then this inequality will be satisﬁed. The main point here is that one reason
that entrepreneurs may be rewarded more for successful ventures is simply that –
given the characteristics of the projects that are undertaken in entrepreneurial ﬁrms
– their ventures are more successful on average.
3 An Equilibrium Model of Entrepreneurship
3.1 A Simple Model of the Labor Market
In the previous section we took the characteristics of the labor market – the prob-
ability of ﬁnding a manager on the outside labor market, p, and the average quality
of managers on that market, λ – as exogenous. We then derived implications
about the types of managers and projects that will be ﬁnanced by entrepreneurial
ﬁrms rather than intrapreneurial ﬁrms. However, p and λ themselves depend on the
extent to which projects are ﬁnanced by entrepreneurial ﬁrms; the average quality
of failed managers depends on how many of them choose to be entrepreneurs. In
17other words, the choice of organizational form – entrepreneurial or intrapreneurial
– depends on the labor market, and the labor market depends on the choice of
organizational form.
Given the potential complexity of the analysis, we need a simple model of the
labor market at date 1. First note that in our model the only managers that are
potentially in the labor market to manage project Y are failed managers of E and
I-ﬁrms. If the owner of a Y project knows that the manager is from an I-ﬁrm, he
will never hire him because the only failed intrapreneurs available in the outside labor
market are bad ones – the good ones are retained by the investors of their I-ﬁrms,
who redeploy them onto their own Y projects. However, entrepreneurs of failed X
projects could be good. The probability that they are good given that they failed in
project X, β




β(1 − θE)+( 1− β)
<β . (26)
Alternatively, one might assume that the owner of Y projects cannot observe
whether the prior employer was an E-ﬁrm or an I-ﬁrm. In this case, β
0,t h ef r a c t i o n
of good managers in the outside labor market at date 1 is the ratio of failed good





αβ(1 − θE)+( 1− β)
, (27)
where α is the fraction of ﬁrms that are entrepreneurial.
In this version of the model, we make the former informational assumption, namely
that investors in Y projects can distinguish between failed entrepreneurs and intrapre-
neurs. In this case, we set λ = β
0.
18Now we need to determine p, the probability that an investor with a Y project
can ﬁnd an failed entrepreneur on the outside labor market. Intuitively, one would
think that if there are more entrepreneurial ﬁrms, there is a greater probability of
being able to ﬁn daf a i l e de n t r e p r e n e u r . O n es i m p l em o d e lo ft h el a b o rm a r k e tt h a t
delivers this reasonable characteristic is that failed entrepreneurs can only go to one
ﬁrm to search for a job and they cannot identify whether the ﬁrm is entrepreneurial
or not, nor whether this ﬁrm needs a new manager or not. If the ﬁrm picked by
the job seeking manager is an I-ﬁrm with a failed but good manager, this ﬁrm does
not need a new manager and the job seeking manager remains unemployed. His
payoﬀ is zero. In all other cases, the ﬁrm is in need of a new manager, and the failed
entrepreneur is hired. In line with the model above, we assume that his wage is zero,
an assumption that we relax later.
Thus, the probability, p, that an investor with a Y project in need of a manager
is matched with a failed entrepreneur is simply the fraction of all managers who fail:
p = α(1 − βθE), (28)
where again α is just the fraction of managers that are entrepreneurs.
Importantly, this expression has the feature that the more entrepreneurs there
are, the greater is the probability that Y project owners in need of a manager can
ﬁnd good managers. We now have all of the elements to study the equilibrium level
of entrepreneurship.
An important implication of this model is that an increase in entrepreneurship
(i.e., a higher α), increases eﬀort in intrapreneurial ﬁrms. It does so by decreasing
the rent, (1 − γ)(1 − pλ)Y , that the good intrapreneurial manager gets when the
project fails. 9 Indeed, an increase in entrepreneurship increasing the probability
9Note that this would also be the case in the alternative labor market model discussed above in
19p that an I-ﬁrm is matched with a failed entrepreneur. (Note that since the eﬀort
in E-ﬁrms, θE, is independent of the level of entrepreneurship, α,s oi st h ea v e r a g e
quality of failed entrepreneurs, λ). In other words, more entrepreneurship increases
the competitive pressure from the outside labor market on failed intrapreneurs, and
thus reduces the rent they can extract from I-ﬁrms. It is thus less costly to induce the
manager of an I-ﬁrm to undertake eﬀort. Indeed, if Y project owners could always
ﬁnd an entrepreneurial manager (p =1 ) and these managers were known to be of
high quality (λ =1 ), there would be no diﬀerence between the two types of ﬁrms.
An implication of this remark is that the expected proﬁto fa ni n v e s t o ri na nI - ﬁrm
increases with the level of entrepreneurship.
Another important implication of the model is that when there are more entrepre-
neurial ﬁrms (i.e., α and p are larger), the relative value of being an entrepreneurial
ﬁrm rather than an intrapreneurial ﬁrm is greater. This can be seen by noticing that
the left hand side of condition (23) increases when p increases. Intuitively, the value
to an I-ﬁrm of being able to redeploy the good manager is reduced when there are
more entrepreneurial ﬁrms and I-ﬁrms would be able to ﬁnd high quality managers.
This attribute of the model will feature prominently in our analysis of equilibrium.
3.2 Equilibria
We now characterize the equilibria in this model. What we will see is that there can
be multiple equilibria. We ﬁrst determine the situations in which equilibrium will be
unique. This will happen when a particular organizational form is optimal regardless
of what other investors choose. If at α = p =0it is still optimal for the investor
which owners of Y projects cannot distinguish between failed entrepreneurs and failed intrapreneurs.
In that model, λ would be increasing in α; the average quality of failed managers is higher when
there are more entrepreneurs in the mix.
20to establish an entrepreneurial ﬁrm, then the only equilibrium is for all ﬁrms to be
entrepreneurial. Formally, this happens when condition (23) is satisﬁed for p =0 ,
which can be written as
β
2c
[X − Y/2] >γ . (29)
By contrast, if it is optimal to be intrapreneurial even if everyone else is entrepre-
neurial, then the unique equilibrium will be for all ﬁrms to be intrapreneurial. This




[X − (1 − (1 − βθE)λ)Y/2] <γ (30)
In the event, however, that these inequalities are not satisﬁed so that
β
2c
[X − (1 − (1 − βθE)λ)Y/2] >γ>
β
2c
[X − Y/2], (31)
then there can be three equilibria.
The ﬁrst is where all ﬁrms are entrepreneurial. In this case, given that all other
ﬁrms are entrepreneurial it makes sense to be entrepreneurial as indicated by the ﬁrst
inequality in condition (31) above. Here, given that the labor market is active, there
is relatively little advantage to being able to redeploy managers in I-ﬁrms.
However, there could be another equilibrium in which all ﬁr m sc h o o s et ob ei n -
trapreneurial. In this case, given by the second inequality in condition (31) above, if
no other ﬁrms are entrepreneurial it is impossible to ﬁnd replacement managers from
the labor market. This makes redeployment of intrapreneurs very valuable.
Finally, there is a third equilibrium in which a fraction α ∈ (0,1) of X projects
are undertaken in entrepreneurial ﬁrms. The fraction α is set such that investors are
indiﬀerent between the two organizational forms. That is, α solves:
21β
2c
[X − (1 − α(1 − βθE)λ)Y/2] = γ. (32)
Note however that the latter equilibrium is highly unstable. For simplicity, we























these results are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 There are two thresholds γ∗ and γ∗∗ with γ∗ <γ ∗∗ such that
(i) If γ<γ ∗,a l lﬁrms are entrepreneurial, i.e., α =1 ;
(ii) If γ>γ ∗∗,a l lﬁrms are intrapreneurial, i.e., α =0 ;
(iii) If γ ∈ [γ∗,γ∗∗],b o t he q u i l i b r i ac o e x i s t( α =1and α =0 ).
We have established that, in our model, characteristics of the external labor mar-
ket, i.e., p and λ,h a v ea ni n ﬂuence on an investor’s choice between becoming an
E-ﬁrm or an I-ﬁrm. However, that choice, in turn, has an impact on the charac-
teristics of the outside labor market which other investors consider in their choice of
organizational form. This feature is what can lead to a multiplicity of equilibria. In
our model, a deeper outside market, i.e., a higher p,m a k e sE - ﬁrms more attractive
relative to I-ﬁrms. Conversely, if investors anticipate that the outside market will not
be very liquid, they will tend to rely more on an internal labor market and thus set
22up I-ﬁrms. This in turn reduces the liquidity of the outside labor market. If instead,
investors took into account the eﬀect of the liquidity of the outside labor market, they
would be more inclined to set up E-ﬁrms, thus contributing to the outside market’s
liquidity.
3.3 Externalities
Having characterized the equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activity, we now study
the properties of equilibrium. A ﬁrst question that we address is whether the equi-
librium always maximizes industry proﬁts as measured by the aggregate expected
proﬁts of all investors. Denote ΠE(α) and ΠI(α) the expected proﬁt of an investor




E + α(1 − βθE)λY. (35)
ΠI(α)=cθ
2
I + βγ(1 − α(1 − βθE)λ)Y + α(1 − βθE)λY (36)
These are obtained by plugging p = α(1 − βθE) into expressions (11) and (21).
Notice ﬁr s tt h a tt h ev a l u eo fa ne n t r e p r e n e u r i a lﬁrm, ΠE(α), is increasing with
the level of entrepreneurship α. T h i si sb e c a u s ea sα increases, the increased arrival
rate of managers from the outside labor market, p, means that entrepreneurial ﬁrms
are more likely to ﬁll a vacant position for managing project Y . This in turn, means
that entrepreneurial investors can sell project Y for a greater amount.
Furthermore, notice that the value of an intrapreneurial ﬁrm, ΠI(α),i sa l s oi n -
creasing with the level of entrepreneurship α.T h r e e e ﬀects lead to this, as can be
seen from expression (36). First, as α increases, the increased arrival rate of managers
23from the outside labor market means that intrapreneurial ﬁrms are more likely to ﬁll
a vacant position for managing project Y if necessary. Second, this increased arrival
rate of outside managers increases potential competition for good intrapreneurs and
thus reduces the level of rent that they can extract following failure. Third, and as
a consequence, this makes it cheaper to provide intrapreneurs with incentives and θI
increases.
Let us now turn to the comparison of the equilibrium level of entrepreneurship to
the level that is optimal from the investors’ point of view. Let α∗ denote the level of
entrepreneurship that maximizes the industry proﬁt
α · ΠE(α)+( 1− α) · ΠI(α). (37)
We prove the following proposition in the appendix.
Proposition 3
(i) There is never an excess of entrepreneurship in equilibrium. That is, whenever
α =1is an equilibrium, then the industry proﬁt maximizing level of entrepre-
neurship is α∗ =1 .
(ii) There can be too little entrepreneurship in equilibrium. This can hold whether
there are multiple equilibria or whether α =0is the unique equilibrium.
The model identiﬁes an externality that may lead to too little entrepreneurial
activity. As described above, when there are more entrepreneurs, there will be a
greater supply of good managers in the labor market; this increases the payoﬀst o
ﬁrms that need new managers. In deciding on an organizational form, however,
everyone takes as given the choices that others make, and thus take as given the
quality of the labor market for managers. As a result, would-be entrepreneurs don’t
24internalize the positive eﬀect they have on the labor market and the payoﬀst oﬁrms
that use it. In equilibrium, there can be too few entrepreneurs.
We now turn to a measure of the social optimality of the equilibrium, and show
that it can exhibit too much or too little entrepreneurship. We deﬁne total welfare
as the sum of expected utility of all agents in the economy. Total welfare is thus
W (α)=αWE(α)+( 1− α)WI(α) (38)
where WE(α) is the contribution to total welfare of an E-ﬁrm and WI(α) that of an
I-ﬁrm when the fraction of E-ﬁrms is α. These contributions can be written as













Proposition 4 Relative to the social optimal level of entrepreneurship,
(i) there can be too much entrepreneurship in equilibrium,
(ii) or too little entrepreneurship in equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The choice between becoming an E-ﬁrm
or an I-ﬁrm is driven by the investor’s comparison between his payoﬀ from X and Y
projects. The comparison depends on the rent that managers are able to extract in
each type of project. In the X project, managers extract a rent due to the incentive
problem. In the Y project, they extract a rent that depends on their bargaining
power relative to investors.
When γ is high, the equilibrium tends to be α =0 , i.e., all investors set up I-ﬁrms.
This is because they extract a larger payoﬀ in Y projects and are thus less eager to
25induce high eﬀort and leave managers with the associated rents. However, from a
total welfare perspective, the splitting of the surplus is irrelevant. So investors might
put too much weight on Y projects relative to ensuring that X projects succeed.
Conversely, when γ is small, the equilibrium tends to be α =1 , i.e., all investors
set up E-ﬁrms. This is because they extract a smaller payoﬀ in Y projects and are
thus less reluctant to induce high eﬀort and leave managers with the associated rents.
Again, this can lead investors to put too much weight on X projects relative to the
success of Y projects.
4 When Entrepreneurship is Bad for Incentives
In the previous section we assumed that ﬁrms have all the bargaining power when
they hire failed entrepreneurs so that they can pay them a wage of zero. This assump-
tion has two undesirable implications. First, it implies that failure in entrepreneurial
ﬁrms is always worse than failure in intrapreneurial ventures. Second, it implies that
the level of entrepreneurial activity has no eﬀect on the payoﬀs to entrepreneurs if
they fail. In this section of the paper, we relax the assumption of zero bargaining
power of failed entrepreneurs and instead consider the case in which failed entrepre-
neurs are able to extract rents from their new ﬁrms. We will see that an increase in
entrepreneurial activity increases the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀs following fail-
ure and thereby adversely aﬀects his incentives. Unlike the previous version of the
model, there can be too much entrepreneurial activity in equilibrium relative to the
level that maximizes industry proﬁts.
To extend the model in the way described above, we need to determine both the
probability q that a failed entrepreneur ﬁnds a new job managing a Y project, and the
payoﬀ he would get in such a job. We assume that failed entrepreneurs actually hired
26to manage a Y p r o j e c td om a n a g et oe x t r a c taf r a c t i o n(1 − γ) of the surplus they
create — just as failed intrapreneurs do. Without the entrepreneur, the Y project
d o e sn o tt a k eo ﬀ, i.e., it is worth zero. With the entrepreneur, perceived to be good
with probability λ,t h ep r o j e c ti sw o r t hλY . Therefore, a failed entrepreneur’s wage
when hired to manage a Y project is
(1 − γ)λY.
Now we need to determine q, the probability that a failed entrepreneur can ﬁnd
aj o bm a n a g i n gaY project.10 Recall that in our simple model of the labor market,
failed entrepreneurs can only go to one ﬁrm to search for a job. Moreover, they
cannot identify whether the ﬁrm is entrepreneurial, nor whether the ﬁrm needs a new
manager. All ﬁrms except I-ﬁrms with a failed good manager need new managers
for the Y project. Therefore,
q = α +( 1− α)(1− β (1 − θI))
=1 − (1 − α)β (1 − θI)
where α is the fraction of managers that are entrepreneurs. Thus, the expected payoﬀ
to a failed entrepreneur is q(1 − γ)λY .
Importantly, this expression has the feature that the more entrepreneurs there are,
the greater is the probability that a failed entrepreneur can ﬁnd a new job managing
a Y project. Intuitively, if there are more entrepreneurial ﬁrms, there is a greater
probability that a failed entrepreneur will be able to ﬁnd such a job. This is because
all the stand-alone Y projects need a manager while the Y projects in intrapreneurial
10This variable was not important in the previous analysis because the payoﬀ of redeployed en-
trepreneurs was assumed to be zero.
27ﬁrms only need managers if the X project succeeds or the incumbent manager is
deemed to be bad. The redeployability of managers in I-ﬁrms reduces their demand
for managers from the outside labor market.
Note also that the expected payoﬀst oﬁrms from having a Y project are changed
because newly hired entrepreneurs have some bargaining power. Now instead of
getting λY with probability p,t h e yg e tγλY with probability p.
Following similar steps as before, we can show that the eﬀort level implemented








[X − (1 − pγλ)Y ].
An important implication of this model is that θE,t h ee ﬀort level implemented in
entrepreneurial ﬁrms, is decreasing with q, everything else being equal. Thus, unlike
the baseline model above, the external labor market has an eﬀect on eﬀort in E-ﬁrms.
Entrepreneurs take into account their expected payoﬀ upon failure which depends on
how likely they will ﬁnd a new job and how much they will receive in that job.11
Recall that in the previous analysis (Proposition 3) there was never an excessive
amount of entrepreneurial activity in equilibrium. Here, we want to show that this
no longer holds, i.e., the equilibrium can exhibit too much entrepreneurship.
Proposition 5 There can be too much entrepreneurship in equilibrium relative to the
level that maximizes industry proﬁts. A suﬃcient condition for this to be the case is
when γ =0and β is near 1.
11This is in contrast with the previous analysis, where θE was independent of characteristics of
the extrenal labor market. The reason for that was our assumption that failed entrerpeneurs receive
a zero payoﬀ in their new job.
28We start by showing that when γ =0 , α =1in equilibrium. We then show that
the level of entrepreneurial activity, α, that maximizes industry proﬁts is less than 1.
4.1 Equilibrium




E + α(1 − βθE)γλY + pγλY (41)
ΠI(α)=cθ
2
I + βγ[1 − α(1 − βθE)γλ]Y + α(1 − βθE)γλY + pγλY (42)
An investor ﬁnds it optimal to set up an E-ﬁrm if and only if ΠE(α)−ΠI(α) > 0,





I − βγ[1 − α(1 − βθE)γλ]Y> 0
When γ =0 , setting up an E-ﬁrm is optimal only if θE >θ I given that the last








[X − Y ].
Since q ≤ 1 and λ<1,w eh a v eθE >θ I. This implies that the only equilibrium is
such that all ﬁrms are entrepreneurial, i.e., α =1 .
294.2 Industry Proﬁts
e now show that there exist parameter values such that α =1does not maximize
industry proﬁts. For γ =0 , industry proﬁt,
α · ΠE(α)+( 1− α) · ΠI(α), (43)
c a nb ew r i t t e na s
α · cθ
2
E +( 1− α) · cθ
2
I.








































(X − (1 + qλ)Y/2)(1 − qλ)Y.




























(1 − (1 − α)β (1 − θI))


























For α =1 ,w eh a v eq =1 . Therefore the derivative of industry proﬁt with respect




(X − (1 + λ)Y/2)(1 − λ)Y − βθE
µ
λβ (1 − θI) −







Now consider β arbitrarily close to 1. In that case, λ is arbitrarily close to 1 and
the expression above is arbitrarily close to
−θE (1 − θI)Y.
Since this is strictly negative, we have shown that for β suﬃciently close to 1,
α =1does not maximize industry proﬁts.
The reason for this result is as follows. At γ =0 ,a n dβ near 1, the diﬀerence in the
eﬀort levels of E-ﬁrms and I-ﬁr m si sv e r ys m a l l .G i v e nt h a tt h e r ei sn or e d e p l o y a b i l i t y
31value to the I-ﬁrm when γ =0 , this implies that proﬁts of the two types of ﬁrms are
very close to each other. Thus, a change in α has no direct eﬀect on industry
proﬁts. However, a reduction in α increases eﬀort in E-ﬁrms because it lowers the
probability that a failed entrepreneur will ﬁnd a job. In determining whether to
be entrepreneurial or intrapreneurial, investors do not take into account the eﬀect of
their decision on the incentives of entrepreneurial ﬁrms. As a result, there is too little
entrepreneurship.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper compares the ﬁnancing of new ventures in start-ups (entrepreneurship)
and in established ﬁrms (“intrapreneurship”) and develops an equilibrium model of
entrepreneurial activity. The beneﬁto fﬁnancing new ventures in established ﬁrms is
that they learn about the quality of their managers over time and can redeploy the
good ones into other jobs when a new venture fails. Failed entrepreneurs, by contrast,
do not have the advantage of an internal labor market and must seek other jobs in
an imperfectly informed external labor market. While this is ex post ineﬃcient, it
provides entrepreneurs with high-powered incentives ex ante. We show that when
entrepreneurship is low, the external labor market is very thin since no one wants to
hire a manager who has been ﬁr e db ya ne s t a b l i s h e dﬁrm. This makes internal labor
markets particularly valuable, encourages intrapreneurship, thereby justifying the low
level of entrepreneurship. If, however, entrepreneurial activity is high, the external
labor market will have a large supply of good (but failed) entrepreneurs. This lowers
the value of the internal labor market and encourages entrepreneurship. Thus, there
can be multiple equilibria.
We also show that there can be too little entrepreneurial activity because entrepre-
32neurs do not take into account the eﬀect of their choice of organizational form on the
functioning of the labor market. When there are more entrepreneurs, there are more
high quality managers in the labor market which makes ﬁrms’ other projects more
valuable. Finally, we extend the model to show that, while the high entrepreneurial
activity has a positive eﬀect on intrapreneurial incentives, it can have a negative ef-
fect on entrepreneurial incentives. When there is active ﬁnancing of start-ups failed
entrepreneurs can easily ﬁnd jobs where they can earn rents. This adversely eﬀects
their incentives, something which investors do not take into account when deciding
whether to be entrepreneurial or not. Thus, we establish conditions under which
there can actually be too much entrepreneurial activity.
There are two main ways in which we plan to extend the analysis. First, we
want to endogenize the number of projects that are undertaken. We have assumed
that X and Y projects are in ﬁxed supply. Thus, we cannot analyze the eﬀect of
entrepreneurial activity on the level of new venture creation. In particular, we would
like to know whether the high rates of high-tech entrepreneurship in the U.S. relative
to Europe are associated with more venture creation or whether it just reﬂects a
displacement of new ventures from established ﬁrms to start-ups? Second, we would
l i k et oe x p l o r et h ed y n a m i c so fe n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p . S p e c i ﬁcally, what are the critical
factors that move economies from low levels of entrepreneurship to high levels of
entrepreneurship and how is the speed of the transition determined?
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
(i) If α =1is an equilibrium, no unilateral deviation is proﬁtable, i.e., ΠE(1) ≥
ΠI(1). This together with the monotonicity of ΠI(α) implies that ΠE(1) ≥ ΠI(α)
for all values of α.S i n c e ΠE(α) is also increasing with α, we have for all values of α,
ΠE(1) ≥ α · ΠE(α)+( 1− α) · ΠI(α). (44)
(ii) We show that ΠE(1) > ΠI(0) is compatible with α =0being an equilibrium.
The diﬀerence ΠE(1) − ΠI(0) c a nb ew r i t t e na s

































































Clearly, one can ﬁnd values of γ such that the diﬀerence above is strictly positive
but arbitrarily close to zero. Since the right hand side of condition (48) is strictly
positive and independent of γ, both conditions can be satisﬁed simultaneously. This
36implies that it is possible that α =0be an equilibrium while α∗ > 0 at the same
time.
Showing that this situation can occur when α =0is the only equilibrium amounts
to showing that conditions (29) and (48) above are compatible with condition (30)
















Again, the right hand side of this expression is strictly positive and independent
of γ. This implies that all conditions can be satisﬁed simultaneously.
Finally, we show that this situation can occur when α =0is the one of sev-
eral equilibria, which amounts to showing that conditions (29) and (48) above are
















One can see that by taking β suﬃciently small, the right hand side of the condition
above can be made arbitrarily small while keeping the other two conditions satisﬁed.
Indeed, neither the left hand side of the conditions nor the right hand side of condition
(48) goes to zero when β goes to zero. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Remark that in our set-up, neither WE(α) nor WI(α) does depend on the bargain-
ing power γ. Hence the socially optimal level of entrepreneurship, α∗∗,i si n d e p e n d e n t
of γ too. We have established that depending on γ, the equilibrium level of entre-
preneurship can be α =0or α =1 .I t s u ﬃces to show that α∗∗ is neither always 0
nor always 1.












+( 1− βθE)λY − β (1 − θI)Y (53)
Noting that as β goes to 1,s od o e sλ,w eh a v e
lim
β→1











− (θE − θI)Y (54)

















It is possible to ﬁnd values of X and Y such that W (1)−W (0) is strictly positive or
strictly negative (without violating the conditions for interior solutions to be obtained
and on which the above expressions are based). Consequently, α∗∗ is neither always
0 nor always 1. Q.E.D.
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